Introduction
Egypt plays a pivotal role in the security of the Middle East as the doorway to Europe. Its military expenditure reflects its involvement in the machinations of such an unstable region and a as a result has shown considerable variation over the last forty years. Being the major Arab country that confronted Israel since its foundation in 1948, Egypt has allocated a sizeable portion of its scarce resources to accumulate weapons and maintain its military forces, along with its neighbours. Its rich history and the availability of relatively good time series data make Egypt a very valuable case study for the determinants of military expenditure and for assessing whether it is the strategic or socioeconomic factors that are dominant. It is also a country that has received only modest attention in the literature.
This study undertakes a time series analysis of the evolution of military spending in Egypt over the period . In the next section of the paper, the trends in Egyptian military spending, since the early 1960s, are discussed and the major strategic factors outlined. The third section specifies and estimates an econometric model of the demand for military spending and the fourth section presents some conclusions.
Military Spending and Strategic and Political Events
Military spending in Egypt has seen marked changes that have passed though different phases of decline and increase. A summary of the major events that have shaped the pattern of military spending of Egypt is provided in Table 1 . The starting point for the modern Egyptian state was the 1952 revolution that was led by the Free Officers Movement following the defeat of the Arab and Egyptian troops in Palestine in 1948 (Helal, 2005) . After a short term of two years as a president, General Mohamed Naguib was overthrown by Abdel Nasser who took over in 1956. The Nasser period was essentially one of military government Military officers made up 64.4% of the cabinet and the Prime Minister was a military officer, with only one exception at the beginning of the period. The political system obtained legitimacy from the charismatic personality of Abdel Nasser and his relation with Egyptian and Arab citizens. His popularity increased after the victory over the tripartite attack by England, France and Israel in 1956 and the nationalization of the Suez Canal (Helal, 2005) .. (Schulze, 2008) .
Sadat used the October war as a political key to open and maintain diplomatic processes and sought the help of the U.S. to return the Sinai region (Stein, 1997 the "open door" economic policy and announced that opposition political parties would be allowed to organize, but slowly. In addition, he announced the application of a plan for the technological improvement of the Egyptian armed forces, which seems to have slowed the decline in military burden for a few years, but did not halt it (Rubin, 2001 ).
Egypt's economic situation showed some improvement in the early 1990's with the U.S.
erasing $7 billion in military debt, after Egypt's help in the 1991 Gulf War and other bilateral lenders following suit. IMF-sponsored reforms saw budget deficit and inflation reduced and debt servicing improved. Privatization continued to be slow, partly because of state-owned enterprises' debts and overstaffing. Although the Israeli front remained quiet after the signing of the peace treaty, Egypt security concerns continued and military spending increased a little to secure both internal and external borders (Cordesman, 2004) . Domestic terrorist attacks by Islamic militants were launched occasionally and caused severe losses to tourism, Egypt's most lucrative export sector. Additionally, the September 11, 2001 attacks added to the grim outlook for tourism and consequently slowed the growth of the Egyptian economy.
Throughout the post-peace treaty period, Egypt continued its strategy of peace and the maintenance of security and has become a major recipient of U.S. military aid to modernise its forces. Egypt's armed forces retain considerable social and economic power. Together with government officials, they are considering the conversion of military factories in to potential more profitable uses as there is a diminishing demand for military goods and ammunition. This is intended to open economic doors and expand employment opportunities (Khilji, 2005; Rubin, 2001 ).
The Determinants of Military Spending
There are two broad groups of empirical studies in the literature on the determinants of military spending. First, studies based on the arms race models of Richardson (1960) , which are best suited to situations in which countries are in conflict and have often failed to perform well empirically (Dunne, 1996; Smith, 1989) . Second, studies focusing on a range of economic, political and strategic determinants of military spending, with the most satisfactory empirical analyses tending to take a relatively comprehensive approach. More recently, these two strands of research have been brought together with arms race dynamics introduced into demand models, giving a more complex structural model than an action-reaction framework and also considering economic, political and military factors.
Formal models often start from the neoclassical perspective that sees the country or state as maximising a social welfare function with security as an integral component 1980 , 1995 . Most theoretical models lead to similar estimation equations for the empirical analysis, where the demand for military expenditure is a function of economic resources, threats to security, and political factors, such as the nature of the state. Defining social welfare to be a function of private consumption C and security S, conditioned on political, strategic, and demographic variables Z:
(1)
The level of security depends, in turn, upon the level of military expenditure M, conditioned on demographic and strategic variables T:
Maximising the social welfare function subject to a budget constraint,
where Y is income, and P m and P c are the prices of M and C relative to an income deflator, gives a demand function:
This equation can then be rewritten as shares in Y rather than levels to give us the demand function commonly used in empirical work (Smith, 1989 (Smith, , 1995 .
To provide an estimable demand function, the income variable needs to be specified, and the political and strategic effects quantified. when the country was engaged in an all-out war and zero otherwise. Finally, it is widely found that democratic countries spend less on the military than non-democracies (e.g. Rosh, 1988; Hewitt, 1991; Maizels and Nissanke, 1986) . Autocratic states are more likely to rely at least partly on the military to retain power, along with a culture and ideology of militarism to justify its rule. Totalitarian states are also more likely to be able to maintain unjustifiable and inefficient levels of spending by the military and other government departments in pursuance of the interests of a public elite rather than the country as a whole. The political system in Egyptian state certainly has autocratic features, that have changed over time. Rather than creating simple dummy variables to reflect political systems, the POLITYIV database was used to construct a variable that reflected the degree of democracy/autocracy in a range of -10 (perfect autocracy) to +10 (perfect democracy) (Marshall , 2009) that is of particular importance in determining military spending. They also question the interpretation of arms race models arguing that threat can be capability and intention, but that most studies measure only capability and so does not tell us about arms races in the conventional sense. This point is made for the case of India and Pakistan by Oren (1994), introducing index of hostility, based on events data. He finds that the level of hostility is significant and positive, but that the military spending reaction coefficients are actually negative.
A different approach was taken by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) who used a pooled static panel of five-year averages with a range of strategic variables. They found the effect of neighbour's military expenditure to be quite large, meaning that increases in military expenditure are escalated among neighbours, making them a regional public bad, suggesting that military expenditure is a regional public bad.
Using a cointegrating ARDL approach, Nikolaidou (2008) estimates demand equations for the 12 largest EU countries separately, finding that the differences between the results suggest that panel methods might not have been appropriate. This implicitly suggests that developing case study analysis is particularly important. In a case study of Greece, Kollias and Paleologou (2003) follow the usual modelling path, but put particular emphasis on incorporating variables that reflect the domestic political changes.
For this study, the empirical specification of the model was a general first order dynamic model of the form: The results of the regression with variables deletion that are portrayed in Table 3 All of the dummies were found to be negative and they are ranked in terms of the size their coefficient estimates in Table 4 . Therefore, the events of 1988, the return to Camp David and the return of Taba, had the strongest negative shift effect, ceteris paribus, followed by 1978, reflecting the initial Camp David talks. Introducing these dummies into the regression leaves 2007 as an extreme value, which may reflect lack of accuracy of the data or a change-taking place in the security relation between Egypt and Israel.
What is striking about the impact of the dummies is that they reduce the impact and significance of the variable reflecting Israel's military burden and increase the size and significance of the lagged dependent variables. A look at Overall, this might be interpreted as suggesting that military burden has a very high institutional inertia and, while effected by economic concerns and possibly some reference to
Israel's military burden, is greatly influenced by specific changes in the security environment.
This would seem consistent with the argument of Dunne et al (2008) that arms race models in the usual sense, using military spending of the protagonists, are only dealing with capability and not with hostility. This suggests that more work needs to be done to find suitable measures of security perceptions and that this will need to move beyond the Polity 2 variables which failed to achieve significance. One possible route is to follow Kollias and Paleologou (2003) in introducing domestic political and electoral variables.
Conclusions
Understanding the determinants of military spending Egypt is an important task. It provides information on a key player in the Middle East region and Africa and provides a valuable case study to add to the growing literature. This paper has attempted to provide a detailed analysis of the economic and strategic factors that drive military spending in the country. In considering the historical background it illustrated the rather 'interesting' history of a country engaged in the Dunne et al (2008) that simple arms race relationships reflect capability and not hostility and that it may be the latter that is most important. This means further work should consider better ways of measuring changes in the security environment in a more sophisticated way that reflects the intentions of protagonists rather than just their changing relative strength. Variables: LMY -log military burden for Egypt, Israel (ISR), Jordan (JOR), and Syria (SYR); LYlog GDP per capita; LXMY -log of net imports in GDP; E-POL2 -polity index. t-stat is in parentheses. 
